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Introduction
Atmospheric CO 2 presently contributes about 63% of the gaseous radiative forcing responsible for anthropogenic climate change (1) . The mean global atmospheric CO 2 concentration has increased from 280 ppm in the 1700s to 380 ppm in 2005, at a progressively faster rate each decade (2, 3, 4, 5) . This growth is governed by the global budget of atmospheric CO 2 (6), which includes two major anthropogenic forcing fluxes: (a) CO 2 emissions from fossilfuel combustion and industrial processes, and (b) the CO 2 flux from land use change, mainly land clearing. A survey of trends in the atmospheric CO 2 budget (5) shows that these two fluxes were respectively 7.9 GtC y −1 and 1.5 GtC y −1 in 2005, with the former growing rapidly over recent years and the latter remaining nearly steady.
This paper is focussed on CO 2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and industrial processes, the dominant anthropogenic forcing flux. We undertake a regionalised analysis of trends in emissions and their demographic, economic and technological drivers, using the Kaya identity (defined below) and annual time-series data on national emissions, population, energy consumption and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Understanding the observed magnitudes and patterns of the factors influencing global CO 2 emissions is a prerequisite for the prediction of future climate and earth system changes, and for human governance of climate change and the earth system. Although the needs for both understanding and governance have been emerging for decades (7, 8) , it is now becoming widely perceived that climate change is an urgent challenge requiring globally concerted action, that a broad portfolio of mitigation measures is required (9, 10) , and that mitigation is not only feasible but highly desirable on economic as well as social and ecological grounds (11, 12) .
The global CO 2 emission flux from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (F) includes contributions from seven sources: national-level combustion of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels, flaring of gas from wells and industrial processes, cement production, oxidation of non-fuel hydrocarbons, and fuel from "international bunkers" used for shipping and air transport (separated because it is often not included in national inventories 
where the fractional contribution of each source to the total F for 2000-2004 is indicated.
The Kaya identity (13, 14, 15) expresses the global F as a product of four driving factors:
where P is global population, G is world GDP or gross world product, E is global primary energy consumption, g = G/P is the per-capita world GDP, e = E/G is the energy intensity of world GDP, and f = F/E is the carbon intensity of energy. Upper-case and lower-case symbols distinguish extensive and intensive variables, respectively. Combining e and f into the carbon intensity of
, the Kaya identity can also be written as
Defining the proportional growth rate of a quantity X(t) as r(X) 
The world can be disaggregated into regions (distinguished by a subscript i) with emission
. Writing a Kaya identity for each region, the global emission F can be expressed by summation over regions as:
and regional contributions to the proportional growth rate in global emissions, r(F), are ( ) ( )
This analysis uses nine non-contiguous regions which span the globe and cluster nations by their emissions and economic profiles. The regions comprise four individual nations (USA, China, Japan and India, identified separately because of their significance as emitters); the European Union (EU); the nations of the Former Soviet Union (FSU); and three regions spanning the rest of the world, consisting respectively of developed (D1), developing (D2) and least developed (D3) countries, excluding countries in other regions.
GDP is defined and measured using either Market Exchange Rates (MER) or Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP), respectively denoted as G M and G P . The PPP definition gives more weight to developing economies. Consequently, wealth disparities are greater when measured by G M than G P , and the growth rate of G P is greater than that of G M (Supporting Information 1).
Our measure of E i is "commercial" primary energy, including (a) fossil fuels, (b) nuclear, and (c) renewables (hydro, solar, wind, geothermal, biomass) when used to generate electricity. (1)) with six IPCC emissions scenarios (14) , and also with stabilisation trajectories describing emissions pathways for stabilisation of atmospheric CO 2 at 450 ppm and 650 ppm (16, 17, 18) . Observed emissions were at the upper edge of the envelope of IPCC emissions scenarios. The actual emissions trajectory since 2000 was close to the highest-emission scenario in the envelope, A1FI.
More importantly, the emissions growth rate since 2000 exceeded that for the A1FI scenario.
Emissions since 2000 were also far above the mean stabilisation trajectories for both 450 ppm and 650 ppm.
A breakdown of emissions among sources shows that solid, liquid and gas fuels contributed (for 2000-2004) about 35%, 36% and 20%, respectively, to global emissions (Equation (1)).
However, this distribution varied strongly among regions: solid (mainly coal) fuels made up a larger and more rapidly growing share of emissions in developing regions (the sum of China, India, D2 and D3) than in developed regions (USA, EU, Japan, D1), and the FSU region had a much stronger reliance on gas than the world average (Supporting Information 3).
To diagnose drivers of trends in global emissions, In the left (MER-based) panel of Figure 2 , the Kaya identity is
The increase in the growth rate of F after 2000 is clear.
Before 2000, F increased as a result of increases in both P and g M at roughly equal rates, offset by a decrease in e M , with f declining very slowly. Therefore, h M = e M f declined slightly more quickly than e M . After 2000, the increases in P and g M continued at about their pre-2000 rates but e M and f (and therefore h M ) ceased to decrease, leading to a substantial increase in the growth rate of F.
In fact, both e M and f have increased since 2002. Similar trends are evident in the right (PPP based) panel of Figure 2 , using the Kaya identity F = Pg P e P f = Pg P h P, (with g P = G P /P, e P = E/G P ,
The long-term (since 1980) rate of increase of g P and the rates of decrease of e P and h P were all larger than for their counterparts g M , e M , h M , associated with the higher global growth rate of G P than of G M (Supporting Information 1). There was a change in the trajectory of e P after 2000, similar to that for e M but superimposed on a larger long-term rate of decrease. Hence, both panels identify the driver of the increase in the growth rate of global emissions after 2000 as a combination of reductions or reversals in long-term decreasing trends in the global carbon intensity of energy (f) and energy intensity of GDP (e).
Regional emissions. The regional distribution of emissions ( Figure 3 ) is similar to that of (commercial) primary energy consumption (E i ) but very different from that of population (P i ), with F i and E i weighted toward developed regions and P i toward developing regions. Drivers of regional emissions are shown in Figure 4 by plotting the normalised factors in the nine regional Kaya identities, using GDP (PPP). Equivalent plots with GDP (MER) are nearly identical (Supporting Information 4).
In the developed regions (USA, Europe, Japan, D1), Differences in intensities across regions are both large (Table 1) and persistent in time. There are enormous differences in income (g i = G i /P i ), the variation being smaller (though still large)
for g Pi than for g Mi . The energy intensity and carbon intensity of GDP (e i = E i /G i and However, the dominant factor accounting for the recent rapid growth in atmospheric CO 2 (over 2 ppm y −1 ) is high and rising emissions, mostly from fossil fuels.
The strong global fossil-fuel emissions growth since 2000 was driven not only by long-term increases in population (P) and per-capita global GDP (g), but also by a cessation or reversal of earlier declining trends in the energy intensity of GDP (e) and the carbon intensity of energy (f).
In particular, steady or slightly increasing recent trends in f occurred in both developed and developing regions. In this sense, no region is decarbonising its energy supply.
Continuous decreases in both e and f (and therefore in carbon intensity of GDP, h = ef) are postulated in all IPCC emissions scenarios to 2100 (14) , so that the predicted rate of global emissions growth is less than the economic growth rate. Without these postulated decreases, predicted emissions over the coming century would be up to several times greater than those from current emissions scenarios (19) . In the unfolding reality since 2000, the global average f has actually increased and there has not been a compensating faster decrease in e. Consequently, there has been a cessation of the earlier declining trend in h. This has meant that even the more fossil-fuel-intensive IPCC scenarios underestimated actual emissions growth during this period.
The recent growth rate in emissions was strongest in rapidly developing economies, particularly China, because of very strong economic growth (g i ) coupled with post-2000
increases in e i , f i and therefore h i = e i f i . These trends reflect differences in trajectories between developed and developing nations: developed nations have used two centuries of fossil-fuel emissions to achieve their present economic status, while developing nations are currently experiencing intensive development with a high energy requirement, much of the demand being met by fossil fuels. A significant factor is the physical movement of energy-intensive activities from developed to developing countries (20, 21) with increasing globalisation of the economy. 
Materials and Methods
Annual time series at national and thence regional scale accounting at country of purchase. The net effect is that the EIA and CDIAC country-level data yield total emissions (by summation) which are within 1% of each other although they include slightly different components of Equation (1), and the CDIAC global total is 4-5% larger than both sums over countries. The second kind of discrepancy arises from differences at country level, the main issue being with data for China. Emissions for China from the EIA and CDIAC datasets both show a significant slowdown in the late 1990s, which is a recognised event (24) associated mainly with closure of small factories and power plants and with policies to improve energy efficiency (25) . However, the CDIAC data suggest a much larger emissions decline for from 1996 to 2002 than the EIA data (Supporting Information 9). The CDIAC emissions estimates are based on the UN energy dataset, which is currently undergoing revisions for China.
Therefore we use EIA as the primary source for emissions data subsequent to 1980.
Figure Legends and Table Caption
Figure 1: Observed global CO 2 emissions including all terms in Equation (1) (2)), or equivalently of the red (P), orange (g), dark blue (h) lines (Equation (3)). Since h = ef, the dark blue line is the product of the green and light blue lines. Sources as in Table 1 . Table 1 , with pre-1980 cumulative emissions from CDIAC. (14) and stabilisation trajectories (16, 17, 18) . EIA emissions data are normalised to same mean as CDIAC data for 1990-1999, to account for omission of F Cement in EIA data (see Materials and Methods). The 2004 and 2005 points in the CDIAC dataset are provisional. The six IPCC scenarios (14) are spline fits to projections (initialised with observations for 1990) of possible future emissions for four scenario families, A1, A2, B1 and B2, which emphasise globalised versus regionalised development on the A,B axis and economic growth versus environmental stewardship on the 1,2 axis. Three variants of the A1 (globalised, economically oriented) scenario lead to different emissions trajectories: A1FI (intensive dependence on fossil fuels), A1T (alternative technologies largely replace fossil fuels) and A1B (balanced energy supply between fossil fuels and alternatives). The stabilisation trajectories (16) are spline fits approximating the average from two models (17, 18) which give similar results. They include uncertainty because the emissions pathway to a given stabilisation target is not unique. (2)), or equivalently of the red (P), orange (g), dark blue (h) lines (Equation (3)). Since h = ef, the dark blue line is the product of the green and light blue lines. Sources as in Table 1 . The intensities e i = E i /G i and f i = F i /E i are defined for commercial primary energy.
Relative to corresponding intensities defined with total primary energy, e i as defined here is an underestimate and f i is an overestimate by the same factor. The carbon intensity of the economy,
, is independent of the definition of primary energy. Table 1 .
Supporting Information 6: The Global Carbon Cycle
In 2005, the cumulative global fossil-fuel emission of CO 2 was C(t) = 319 GtC and the cumulative emission from the other major CO 2 source, land use change, was 156 GtC (5) . Of the total cumulative emission from both sources (~480 GtC), less than half (~210 GtC) has remained in the atmosphere, the rest having been taken up by land and ocean sinks (6) 
